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Abstract 
We analyze a competitive search environment where heterogeneous workers and firms make costly 
investments (e.g. in education and physical capital, respectively) before they enter the labor market. A 
key novelty with respect to existing work is that we allow for multidimensional heterogeneity on both 
sides of the market. Our environment features transferable utility and symmetric information. As in 
classical hedonic models, wages depend both on the job's and on the worker's match-relevant 
characteristics. Yet the presence of search frictions implies that (unlike in those models) markets do not 
clear. The hedonic wage function and probabilities of finding and filling different jobs are determined 
endogenously in a competitive search equilibrium. We show that constrained efficient allocations can 
be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem, whereas the wage function 
supporting these allocations and associated expected payoffs for workers and firms correspond to the 
solutions of the `dual' of that linear program. We use this characterization to show that a competitive 
search equilibrium exist and is constrained efficient under very general conditions. Jerez (2014) makes 
a similar point in the context of a model where all the match-relevant characteristics of the traders are 
exogenous. Here we extend the analysis to allow for two-sided ex-ante investments which are 
potentially multidimensional. The fact that linear programming techniques have been used for the 
structural estimation of frictionless matching models suggests that our framework is potentially useful 
for empirical studies of labor markets and other hedonic markets (like that for housing) where search 
frictions are prevalent 
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Diamond (1981, 1982), Mortensen (1982a, 1982b) and Pissarides (1984,
1985), search equilibrium models have become a dominant paradigm to study labor markets. These
models abandon the classical assumption of a frictionless trading process that always clears the
market. The so-called Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and bargaining model instead intro-
duces a costly trading technology by means of an exogenous matching function which generates
simultaneous rationing (and thus trading delays) on both sides of the market. Such a model gen-
erates frictional unemployment in equilibrium, and is consistent with the simultaneous coexistence
of unemployment and unﬁlled job vacancies. This kind of two-sided rationing is observed in other
markets. In the housing market, for instance, in a given period (e.g. each month) there are owners
with property on the market who do not manage to sell, and households searching for a housing
unit who do not complete a transaction during the period either.1
Competitive search (also referred to as directed search) models have received an increasing at-
tention in recent years. These models deviate from the search and bargaining model in that they
abstract away from ineﬃciencies arising from bilateral monopoly power. The earlier competitive
search literature instead focuses solely on search and matching frictions (e.g. see Montgomery
(1991), Peters (1991, 1997, 2000), Moen (1997), Shimer (1996,2005), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,
1999b), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), Shi (2001), and Mortensen and Wright (2002)). In com-
petitive search models of the labor market, ﬁrms typically compete ex ante by publicly posting
(and committing to) job oﬀers, and workers then direct their search to the more attractive oﬀers.
Because ﬁrms posting more attractive oﬀers attract more job applicants on average, they are able
to ﬁll their vacancies faster.2 Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991), Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996)
were among the ﬁrst to show that competitive search equilibria are constrained eﬃcient. Whereas
these authors consider simple environments with homogeneous buyers and/or sellers, subsequent
1Search models are becoming increasingly popular in quantitative studies of the housing market. See, among
others, Díaz and Jerez (2013), Head, Lloyd-Ellis, and Sun (2014) and Ngai and Tenreyro (2014), and the literature
cited therein.
2By contrast, in search and bargaining models wages are determined ex post, once the ﬁrm and the worker meet
(e.g. by means of the generalized Nash bargaining rule), so they do not aﬀect the traders' rationing probabilities.
Competitive search models diﬀer also from the price posting models introduced by Burdett and Judd (1983) and
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The later models feature imperfect competition since, even though ﬁrms compete
ex ante by posting wages, (rather than directing their search to the more attractive oﬀers) workers sample randomly
from the wage oﬀer distribution. See Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for a comprehensive review of the labor
search literature.
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work has generalized their results to more general environments. In particular, Shi (2001), Shimer
(2005), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) allow for two-sided one-dimensional heterogeneity.
This paper is particularly related to the work of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b), Shi (2001) and
Masters (2011), who argue that competitive search solves the familiar hold-up problem. Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999b) analyze a model where ﬁrms make investments in physical capital before en-
tering the labor market, so as to increase the value of future production. They show that, in the
search and bargaining model, ﬁrms' investments are ineﬃciently low, partly because some of the sur-
plus these investments generate is appropriated by the ﬁrms' future employees (see also Acemoglu
(1996)).3 With competitive search, however, ﬁrms have additional incentives to invest. Because
ﬁrms making higher investments are more productive, they can also oﬀer higher wages. This in
turn allows them to ﬁll their job vacancies faster. In a competitive search equilibrium the share
of the surplus that accrues to a ﬁrm is determined endogenously, and this share is such that ﬁrms
receive the social marginal product of their investment. As a result, the ﬁrms' ex-ante investments
are eﬃcient. Whereas in Acemoglu and Shimer's (1999b) model workers and ﬁrms are homogeneous
and only ﬁrms make ex-ante investments, Shi (2001) shows that the eﬃciency result holds also if
workers have heterogeneous skills. Masters (2011) reaches the same conclusion in a model where
homogeneous workers and ﬁrms make complementary ex-ante investments in physical and human
capital, respectively. In all three papers the observability of the agents' investments and of their
match-relevant characteristics which rules out asymmetric information problems is crucial for the
eﬃciency result.
To the best of our knowledge, the model in this paper is the ﬁrst in the search literature which
jointly captures the rich two-sided heterogeneity which characterizes the labor market, and the
fact that agents on both sides of the market may make ex-ante investments so as to enhance their
match-relevant characteristics. It is worth noting that models with these features do exist in the
frictionless matching literature (e.g. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001), Peters (2009) and Felli
and Roberts (2016) allow for one-dimensional two-sided heterogeneity, and Dizdar (2015) allows for
multidimensional two-sided heterogeneity).4 Following the latter literature, we consider an environ-
3Acemoglu (1996) studies a search and bargaining model where workers also make ex-ante investments.
4The authors study the eﬃciency and existence properties of competitive equilibria under full information. See
also Peters and Siow (2002), who study an environment with non-transferable utility. Recent work by Mailath,
Postlewaite and Samuelson (2013, 2016) extends the analysis of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) to an adverse
selection environment where the worker's investments are private information.
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ment with transferable utility and complete information about the match-relevant characteristics of
the traders.5 The class of economies we study is large, as we allow for general production, utility
and matching functions, general distributions of worker and ﬁrm types, and endogenous market
participation.
As is standard in the applied labor literature (e.g. studying how labor market outcomes vary
across diﬀerent groups of workers6), in our model workers are heterogeneous in several dimensions,
and the same is true for the jobs ﬁrms create. As emphasized by Lucas (1977), a distinguishing
feature of labor markets is that, just like the payoﬀs of the ﬁrms depend on the match-relevant
characteristics of the workers they hire, the workers' payoﬀs depend on the hedonic attributes of
the jobs performed. From this perspective, our framework can be viewed as embedding the classical
hedonic model of Rosen (1974) and Lucas (1977) into the competitive search formulation.
We consider an environment where workers diﬀer in several exogenous characteristics (e.g. age,
gender, innate talent...), and may invest in a multidimensional vector of hedonic attributes (e.g.
years and quality of schooling, skills acquired/enhanced through education,· · · ) before they apply
for a job. Jobs are modeled as diﬀerentiated goods (e.g. indexed by occupation, tasks and skill
requirements, working conditions, location and hours...). Prior to hiring their employees, ﬁrms make
multidimensional investments (e.g. in technology and computerization, plant and equipment,...).
These investments aﬀect the value of employing diﬀerent kinds of workers. In particular, in certain
5See Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) for a competitive search model with risk aversion, and Peters and Severinov
(1997), Faig and Jerez (2005), Guerrieri (2008), Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) and Moen and Rosen (2011)
for extensions which feature asymmetric information. See also recent work by Fernández-Blanco and Gomes (2016),
who consider a version of Shi (2001)'s model where the worker's productivity is unobservable to the ﬁrm.
6By way of example, it is worth mentioning a few interesting contributions. For instance, Dustmann, Ludsteck,
and Schnberg (2009) challenge previous work claiming that (unlike in the US) the wage distribution in Germany
was fairly stable in the 1980s and the 1990s, and instead document a substantial increase in wage inequality. The
authors decompose the relative importance of the main drivers of the increase in inequality both for the top and
the bottom tails of the wage distribution. These include changes in the workforce composition (in terms of age and
education), demand factors such as the polarization of labor demand across occupations requiring diﬀerent skill levels
(which is linked to computerization) and changes in labor market institutions. Another well-known paper by Bover,
Arellano, and Bentolila (2002) uses a longitudinal sample of Spanish men in 1987-94 to study the inﬂuence beneﬁt
duration on the exit rate from unemployment into employment, controlling for observed worker characteristics (e.g.
education, age, being or not head of the household,...), for unobserved worker heterogeneity, and for sectoral dummy
variables. Carrasco and García-Pérez (2015) perform a similar analysis of the Spanish labor market distinguishing
between natives and immigrants (by country of origin of the latter). Finally, a recent paper by Burstein, Morales,
and Vogel (2015), seeks to identify the main drivers behind the pronounced changes in relative wages across groups of
workers with diﬀerent characteristics in the US in the past decades. The authors develop and estimate a (frictionless)
occupational choice model where workers of diﬀerent gender and education level are assigned across diﬀerent jobs
and equipment types (one of which is computers). Their results point to computerization and to changes in task
productivity as the main drivers of changes in between-education-group inequality and the rise of the skill premium.
According to their estimates, these factors also explain roughly half of the rise in the female/male wage.
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jobs (e.g. involving routine or easy to automate tasks), investments in computerization make it easier
to replace workers with machines (as the two production inputs become highly substitutable). If
so, workers in turn will beneﬁt from investing in attributes which are complements (rather than
substitutes) to the new capital.7 The ﬁrm's investments may also aﬀect the hedonic attributes of
the jobs ﬁrms create. For instance, the ﬁrms' investment in technology/equipment can aﬀect the
tasks performed by workers,8 their working conditions (e.g. the degree of health risk implied by
the job), and even the job's location (e.g. in certain occupations, computerization increasing allows
working from home).
In our model, the hedonic wage function and the probabilities of ﬁlling and ﬁnding diﬀerent
jobs are determined endogenously in a competitive search equilibrium. Under the aforementioned
symmetric information assumption, we show that competitive search equilibria are constrained
eﬃcient, and provide a general existence theorem. In these sense, our results generalize those of
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b), Shi (2001) and Masters (2011) to a large class of competitive search
environments. While our presentation focuses on the labor market, the model applies to other
hedonic markets (like that for housing) where search frictions are prevalent.9
There is an important methodological diﬀerence between this paper and the search literature
cited above. Whereas this literature uses strategic (game-theoretic) models, here we adopt the
Walrasian (price-taking) approach proposed in Jerez (2014). In a nutshell, that paper shows that the
Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium notion can be extended to environments with search frictions,
essentially by replacing market clearing with a trading technology that is not frictionless (e.g. an
exogenous matching technology). The key modeling choice is to incorporate the uncertainty arising
from rationing in the deﬁnition of a commodity (in the spirit of the Arrow-Debreu theory). Prices
of commodities then depend not only on their physical characteristics, but also on the probability
that their trade is rationed. In a competitive equilibrium traders take prices as given. They also
take as given rationing probabilities, because they are part of the description of a commodity. In
equilibrium, the price system adjusts so that the optimal decisions of the agents are consistent with
7Deming (2015) ﬁnds evidence that in the past decades socials skills have been increasingly rewarded by the labor
market, specially when combined with cognitive skills.
8For instance, Deming (2015) shows that advances in information and communication technology tend to increase
job rotation and the degree of worker multitasking.
9Houses are diﬀerentiated goods that are valued for their hedonic characteristics. Whereas some of these charac-
teristics are exogenous, house owners and landlords oftentimes invest in costly renovation activities which alter the
houses' attributes before they put their property on the market.
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the trading technology. Jerez (2014) shows that this price-taking equilibrium notion is a reduced
form of the strategic notion used in the literature. The point is made in the context of a related
model where all the match-relevant characteristics of the traders are exogenous. Here we extend the
Walrasian model in Jerez (2014) to allow for two-sided ex-ante investments which are potentially
multidimensional.
The strength of the Walrasian formulation is that it allows us to apply the powerful tools of
general equilibrium theory to derive our main results. Speciﬁcally, both here and in Jerez (2014),
we adopt the linear programming approach used by Shapley (1955), Shapley and Shubik (1972),
and Grestky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, 1999) to study frictionless matching models with transferable
utility. (See also more recent work by Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010) and Dizdar (2015),
among others). Speciﬁcally, we show that constrained eﬃcient allocations can be determined as so-
lutions to a linear programming (LP) problem, whereas the hedonic wage function supporting these
allocations and the associated expected payoﬀs for workers and ﬁrms correspond to the solutions
of the dual of that linear program. We use this characterization to show that competitive search
equilibria exist and are constrained eﬃcient. Linear programming techniques have not only proved
useful to derive the properties of equilibrium allocations in diﬀerent settings.10 They have also been
used in empirical work. In particular, Galichon and Salanié (2012), Dupuy and Galichon (2014),
and Fox (2010) use these techniques for the identiﬁcation and estimation of frictionless matching
models with transferable utility. This suggests that a similar methodology could be used to take
competitive search models to the data at a high degree of disaggregation.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 describes the environment. In Section 3 we present
the general equilibrium model and deﬁne a competitive search equilibrium. For the purpose of
the exposition, these sections assume that ﬁrms are ex-ante symmetric an assumption which is
widely used in the literature (e.g. Shi (2001)). Section 4 describes the LP problem and its dual,
and characterizes constrained eﬃcient allocations via the complementary slackness theorem of linear
programming. As in Grestky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, 1999), the welfare and existence theorems
follow directly from this theorem. Section 5 presents the general version of the model where ﬁrms
10Makowski and Ostroy (1996, 2003) analyze a (frictionless) competitive economy with divisible goods. Myerson
(1984) highlights the linear programming structure of principal agent models, an structure which has been exploited
by Manelli and Vincent (1995) to characterize optimal procurement mechanisms. Jerez (2003) and Song (2012)
exploit this linear structure to analyze competitive economies with informational (but no search) frictions. See also
the book by Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow (1987).
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are heterogeneous ex-ante, and shows that it is just a twist of the model presented so far. The
LP formulation corresponding to the general model and the technical details are presented in the
Appendix.
2 The Environment
Consider a one-period search model with a measure ξˆ ∈ <++ of ex-ante symmetric ﬁrms,11 and a
continuum of heterogeneous workers. Worker types are indexed by s ∈ S, where S is a compact set.
The population of workers is described by a Borel measure on S with full support: ξS ∈ M+(S).
As is customary in the literature, we assume that ﬁrms are risk neutral and workers have von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions which are quasilinear in a divisible numeraire. Also, each
ﬁrm has a single job opening, and workers can have at most one job.
Prior to entering the labor market, both workers and ﬁrms can choose to make investments
which aﬀect the output that will be produced when a ﬁrm employs a worker. Workers of type s
can invest in a list of attributes h ∈ H at cost c(s, h). Think of h as a description of the worker's
education (e.g. years and quality schooling, skills acquired/enhanced through education,· · · ), and
of s as a list of exogenous characteristics, some of which may aﬀect the cost of acquiring education.
For instance, workers may diﬀer in their innate talent or in their social background. For some types
s, certain values of h may be simply unattainable because c(s, h) is too large. Firms can also make
multidimensional ex-ante investments a ∈ A (e.g. in a speciﬁc technology, equipment type, . . . ) at
cost C(a). We assume that c(s, h) and C(a) are continuous functions. So, for workers with similar
exogenous characteristics, the costs of acquiring similar attributes are similar. And, for a given ﬁrm,
the costs of making similar investments are also similar. Workers and ﬁrms may not invest at all;
these choices are denoted by h0 ∈ H and a0 ∈ A, respectively, where c(·, h0) = C(a0) = 0. In what
follows, we take S,H and A to be arbitrary compact metric spaces.
A ﬁrm which invests in a and hires a worker with attributes h produces f(h, a) units of out-
put.12 We assume that f is continuous, so ﬁrms making similar investments have similar production
11In this version of the model, all the attributes of a job are endogenous and will depend on the ﬁrm's ex-ante
investments (see below).
12So output depends on the endogenous investments of the worker and the ﬁrm, but does not depend on the
worker's type (e.g. see also Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001)). We could instead assume that output depends
on both on the worker's type and on the attributes she has acquired (e.g. see Felli and Roberts (2016)). In general,
6
technologies, and workers with similar attributes have similar productivity at a given job.
The worker's disutility of labor depends on the job's hedonic attributes, which we assume are
determined by a. This disutility, which we denote by v(s, h, a), may also depend on the worker's
exogenous characteristics s and/or endogenously acquired attributes h. For instance, as a recent
article in The Economist notes, blue-collar male workers are usually reluctant to work in certain
jobs, such as health workers or hairdressers, which have been traditionally regarded as feminine.13
Another illustrative example is that of female workers who have children, who oftentimes have a
preference for jobs which are compatible with child rearing (e.g. teaching and part-time jobs, and
jobs that allow to work from home).14 We assume that the function v is continuous, so the disutility
of labor at a given job is similar for workers whose types and attributes are similar. We normalize
the disutility of the unemployed to zero. We shall assume that, for each choice a ∈ A ﬁrms can
make, there is a worker type s ∈ S and a choice of h ∈ H by that worker type that generates a
positive bilateral surplus: f(h, a)− C(a)− c(s, h)− v(s, h, a) > 0.
The ex-ante investments of workers and ﬁrms are assumed observable, so ﬁrms know the kind of
labor they are hire and workers know the kind of jobs they accept. As in the Arrow-Debreu model,
the payoﬀs of the agents are private information, and all the relevant information is transmitted
through wages.
Following Lucas (1977), the jobs created in matches where the jobs' attributes a and/or the
worker's attributes h diﬀer are regarded as diﬀerentiated.15 These diﬀerentiated jobs will be created
in diﬀerent (segmented) labor markets.16 Many diﬀerentiated jobs, indexed by (h, a) ∈ H ×A, can
then potentially be created in our model. Whether or not type-(h, a) jobs are created (i.e., some
workers choose h, some ﬁrms choose a, and some of these workers end up working for some of these
ﬁrms) will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. The reader may want to think of the special
some types may be more productive at certain jobs. (For instance, Deming (2015) mentions the female advantage in
social skills, and conjectures that it is related with the fall in the wage gender gap.) In our model these diﬀerences
are embedded in the cost c(h, s) of acquiring attributes that are required for performing that job eﬀectively. In any
case, all our results go through when output is given by f(s, h, a) provided the components of s that aﬀect f are
observable.
13See article The Weaker Sex, May 30th 2015.
14See Erosa, Fuster, Kambourov, and Rogerson (2016).
15Admittedly, for some low-skilled jobs, the worker's investments may not matter in terms of output: f(h, a) = f(a).
It is easy to devise a simple variant of the model where these jobs are described by a only.
16This is a standard feature of directed search (as opposed to random search) models. See, for instance, Shi (2001)
and Menzio and Shi (2010). These authors treat the worker's attributes as exogenous. In particular, in Shi's model,
output is given by f(a, s) and a job is described by a pair (a, s), where both a and s are one-dimensional objects.
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case where the set of jobs that can be created is ﬁnite. Indeed, in empirical applications S, H and
A will be ﬁnite sets (i.e., s will be a ﬁnite list of characteristics, each of which can take a ﬁnite
number of values, and so will h and a).17
The trading process in the labor market is characterized by search frictions, meaning that not
all workers searching for a job will ﬁnd one and the same is true for ﬁrms who seek to ﬁll a vacancy.
Moreover, job ﬁlling and job ﬁnding probabilities will vary across jobs (e.g. some jobs may be harder
to ﬁnd/ﬁll than others). This is in contrast to a Walrasian labor market where workers and ﬁrms
can trade instantaneously at the wages that clear the market.
We assume that ﬁrms who seek to ﬁll vacancies of type-(h, a) and workers searching for these
kind of jobs meet bilaterally and at random. It is standard in the literature to describe this random
meeting process by an exogenous matching function with constant returns to scale. To ease notation,
suppose that the matching function is the same in all markets. Let β be the measure of ﬁrms and
σ the measure of workers in a given market. The matching functionM(β, σ) determines the total
measure of bilateral matches, whereM : R2+ → R+ is continuous, increasing, and homogeneous of
degree one. Since the total number of matches cannot exceed the number of traders in the short
side of the market,M(β, σ) ≤ min{β, σ}. In particular,M(0, σ) =M(β, 0) = 0 (e.g. if no workers
invest in h and/or no ﬁrms invest in a, no jobs of this type will be created).
We assume that the Law of Large Numbers holds, so the probability that a worker ﬁnds a job
in this market is
m(θ) =
M(β, σ)
σ
=M(θ, 1), (2.1)
where θ = βσ ∈ <+ is the ratio of ﬁrms to workers searching in the market, or the level of market
tightness. Likewise, the probability that a ﬁrm ﬁnds an employee in this market is
α(θ) =
M(β, σ)
β
=M(1, θ−1) = m(θ)θ−1, (2.2)
with the convention that α(0) = limθ→0 α(θ). The function m(θ) is continuous and increasing,
whereas α(θ) is continuous and decreasing. It is standard to assume that m(0) = 0, limθ→∞m(θ) =
1, α(0) = 1 and limθ→∞ α(θ) = 0. Intuitively, the higher the market tightness θ, the easier it is
17In this case, the continuity of c, C, f and v holds trivially.
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for workers to ﬁnd a job and the harder it is for ﬁrms to ﬁll a job in a given market. As θ goes to
inﬁnity (zero), the job ﬁnding probability goes to one (zero) and the job ﬁlling probability goes to
zero (one). Note that α(θ) and m(θ) also represent the fractions of ﬁrms and workers in the market
who are successful in their search for an employment relationship, whereas 1 − α(θ) and 1 −m(θ)
are the fractions of ﬁrms and workers who are rationed.
Our analysis and all our results extend directly to the case where the matching function diﬀers
across jobs. For instance, the use of digital platforms which allow to match workers with jobs
more eﬃciently is more widespread in some job markets than in others (e.g. that for computer
engineers vs. that for machine operators or domestic workers). In this more general case, the total
number of bilateral matches in the market for type-(h, a) jobs is given by Mˆ(β, σ;h, a), where Mˆ
be continuous (so the random matching process for similar jobs is similar), and where, for a given
(h, a), Mˆ(·, ·;h, a) has the properties stated above.
3 The general equilibrium model
In this section we show that constrained eﬃcient allocations can be characterized as solutions to a
LP problem. We then deﬁne a competitive (price-taking) search equilibrium. The analysis follows
closely that in Jerez (2014). As we have already noted, in that paper the characteristics of the traders
on both sides of the market are exogenous. Also, in Jerez (2014) buyers have diﬀerent valuations
depending on the type of seller they trade with (because diﬀerent seller types oﬀer diﬀerent goods),
but the valuations of the sellers do not depend on the characteristics of the buyers they trade with.
By contrast, in the current model, just like the ﬁrm's payoﬀ depends on the worker's attributes, the
worker's payoﬀ depend on the attributes of the job performed. As we have already noted, this is a
distinguishing feature of labor markets.
Allocations
An allocation is an assignment of workers and ﬁrms to diﬀerent markets. We represent a market
by a triple (h, a, θ) ∈ H × A × <+, describing the type of job created (h, a) and the tightness
level θ prevailing in the market. Consistency requires that only workers investing in h and ﬁrms
investing in a are assigned to market (h, a, θ) (see below). Recall that the value of θ determines
9
the probabilities of ﬁnding and ﬁlling a job, and thus the degree of trading uncertainty that
workers and ﬁrms face in this market. In the spirit of Arrow-Debreu theory, our description of
the commodities traded in the diﬀerent markets, (h, a, θ) ∈ H × A × <+, includes this trading
uncertainty. To allow for the possibility of non-participation, we introduce an arbitrary real number
θ0 < 0, and extend the probability functions in (2.1) and (2.2) to the set Θ ≡ <+ ∪ {θ0} by setting
m(θ0) = α(θ0) = 0. Agents who do not participate in the labor market will be assigned to the
ﬁctitious market x0 = (h0, a0, θ0).18
As is standard in general equilibrium models with a continuum of heterogeneous agents, we use
measures to describe allocations. We ﬁrst introduce some necessary notation. For a given a metric
space Y , let Mc(Y ) denote the space of signed regular Borel measures on Y with compact support,
endowed with the weak-star topology. If Y is compact, this is just the spaceM(Y ) of signed regular
Borel measures on Y . We denote the support of a measure ν ∈Mc(Y ) by suppν.
Let X ≡ (H ×A×<+)∪{x0} be the set of all markets that can potentially be active (including
the ﬁctitious one). An allocation is described by a pair of measures, (µB, µS) ∈Mc+(X)×Mc+(S×
X). The measure µB describes the assignment of ﬁrms across markets, whereas µS describes the
corresponding assignment for workers. That is, µB(Ω) is the measure of ﬁrms assigned to an arbitrary
Borel set of markets Ω ⊆ H×A×<+ (i.e., the aggregate labor demand in these markets). Similarly,
µS(D × Ω) is the measure of workers with types s in the Borel set D ⊆ S who are assigned to a
market in Ω (the total supply of labor by workers of type s ∈ D in these markets). On the other
hand, µS(D×{x0}}) (respectively, µB({x0})) is the measure of these workers (the measure of ﬁrms)
who do not participate.
The marginals of µS on S and X, which we denote by µSS ∈M+(S) and µSX ∈Mc+(X), provide
additional information about the allocation. On the one hand, µSX(Ω) is the total measure of
workers assigned under the allocation to market in the set Ω (i.e., the aggregate labor supply in
these markets). On the other hand, µSS(D) is the total measure of workers with types s ∈ D who
are assigned to an element of X under the allocation.19
With this description, the set of markets where ﬁrms participate is given by the support of
18We assume that agents who do not participate in the market make no investments. Clearly, it would be suboptimal
for them to do so, because their expected payoﬀ would be negative. Since we focus on constrained eﬃcient allocations,
this is without loss of generality.
19The marginal of µS on H and the marginal of µB on A in turn describe the total measure of workers and ﬁrms
investing in a given set of attributes.
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µB, whereas the set of markets where workers participate is given by the support of µSX . We
say that a market (h, a, θ) is active under the allocation if it attracts both workers and ﬁrms:
(h, a, θ) ∈ suppµB ∩ suppµSX .
Feasible allocations
Feasible allocations assign (almost) all the workers and ﬁrms in the economy to an element of
X. That is, the total measure of ﬁrms assigned under the allocation must be equal to ξˆ:
µB(X) = ξˆ, (3.1)
whereas the total measure of assigned workers of a given type s must be equal to the measure of
such types who are present in the population:
µSS(D) = ξ
S(D) for all Borel D ⊆ S; (3.2)
or, in short, µSS = ξ
S .
Feasible allocations must also be consistent with respect to the matching technology, so that in
each active market the measure of workers who ﬁnd jobs is equal to the measure of job vacancies
ﬁlled by ﬁrms:
∫
(h,a,θ)∈Ω
α(θ)dµB(h, a, θ) =
∫
(h,a,θ)∈Ω
m(θ)dµSX(h, a, θ) for all Borel Ω ⊆ H ×A×<+. (3.3)
Recall that µB describes the measure of ﬁrms assigned to the diﬀerent markets, and that the fraction
of ﬁrms who ﬁll a vacancy in market (h, a, θ) is equal to α(θ). The term on the left-hand side of (3.3)
thus represents the measure of ﬁrms which successfully ﬁll a vacancy in an arbitrary set of markets
Ω ⊂ H ×A×<+ (and thus the measure of jobs that are created in those markets). Likewise, since
µSX describes the measure of workers assigned to the diﬀerent markets and m(θ) is the fraction of
workers who ﬁnd a job in market (h, a, θ), the right-hand side of (3.3) represents the measure of
workers who ﬁnd a job in the set of markets Ω.
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Constrained eﬃcient allocations
In the presence of search frictions the social planner can assign workers and ﬁrms to diﬀerent
markets, but cannot directly assign workers to ﬁrms (as in frictionless matching models). Formally,
the problem of the planner is to choose a feasible allocation so as to maximize social welfare,
∫
X
[α(θ)f(h, a)− C(a)]dµB(h, a, θ)−
∫
S×X
[m(θ)v(s, h, a) + c(s, h)]dµS(s, h, a, θ). (3.4)
The ﬁrst term in (3.4) measures the economy's aggregate output net of the total cost of the ﬁrms'
ex-ante investments. Again, µB describes the measure of ﬁrms who are assigned to each market. A
fraction α(θ) of the ﬁrms in market (h, a, θ) create jobs and produce f(h, a) units of output; the rest
are rationed and produce nothing. Also, whether or not they end up creating a job, all the ﬁrms
in this market face the cost C(a) of their ex-ante investments. The ﬁrst term in (3.4) aggregates
these outputs and costs across all active markets. The second term in (3.4) is interpreted similarly.
Recall that µS describes the measure of workers of a given type s who are assigned to each market
(h, a, θ). All these workers face the cost c(s, h) of their ex-ante investments. Yet only a fraction
m(θ) of them ﬁnd a job, their disutility of labor being v(s, h, a). (Recall that the disutility of the
unemployed is zero). The second term in (3.4) aggregates the disutilities of the workers and the
costs of their ex-ante investments across all markets. Therefore, the expression in (3.4) represents
the total welfare gains implied by the allocation.
As in Jerez (2014), the feature of the model we shall emphasize and exploit is the fact that
the planner's objective function (3.4) and the feasibility constraints (3.1)(3.3) are all linear in
the allocation (µB, µS). Note that all the (non-constant) terms in these equations are eﬀectively
integrals with respect to the measures µB and/or µS . (In particular, the marginals µSS and µ
S
X are
deﬁned as integrals with respect to µS .) Before laying out the details of the linear programming
formulation, we deﬁne a competitive search equilibrium.
Competitive search equilibrium
Let w(h, a, θ) ∈ <+ denote the wage in market (h, a, θ) ∈ H × A× <+. As in classical hedonic
models, wages depend both on the attributes of the worker and the attributes of the job. Moreover,
as in competitive search models, wages also depend on the market tightness level. The dependence
of wages on θ is intuitive. When θ is lower, ﬁrms are more likely to ﬁll a job vacancy, so (other
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things equal) they are willing to pay higher wages to complete a transaction. Similarly, since
workers are more likely to ﬁnd a job when θ is higher, they are also willing to accept lower wages
under this circumstances. It is convenient to extend the hedonic wage function w to the ﬁctitious
market x0 by setting w(x0) = 0. We follow Mas-Colell's (1975) description of the price system for
economies with a continuum of diﬀerentiated commodities, and assume that wages are described
by a continuous function w ∈ C+(X). The continuity assumption implies that markets for similar
jobs where tightness levels are also similar have similar wages.
In a competitive search equilibrium workers and ﬁrms take wages as given. In addition, all
agents have rational expectations about the tightness level θ prevailing in each market, and hence
about the probability with which they will complete a transaction if they choose to enter those
markets. The expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm which ﬁrst invests in attributes a and then enters market
(h, a, θ) is
pi(h, a, θ;w) = α(θ) [f(h, a)− w(h, a, θ)]− C(a). (3.5)
Prior to entering the market, the ﬁrm pays the cost of investing in a. Once in the market, the ﬁrm
ﬁlls a job with probability α(θ), in which case it produces f(h, a) units of output and pays the wage
w(h, a, θ). With complementary probability, the ﬁrm remains inactive.
The expected utility of a type-s worker who invests in attributes h and then enters market
(h, a, θ) is
u(s, h, a, θ;w) = m(θ) [w(h, a, θ)− v(s, h, a)]− c(s, h) (3.6)
The worker ﬁrst pays the cost of investing in h. Once she enters the market, she ﬁnds a job
with probability m(θ), in which case she receives the wage net of the disutility of working. With
complementary probability, the worker is unemployed and his (ex post) utility is zero.
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive search equilibrium is a feasible allocation (µB∗, µS∗) ∈ Mc+(X) ×
Mc+(S ×X) and a wage function w∗ ∈ C+(X) such that:
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(i) Firms choose (h, a, θ) in X to maximize their expected proﬁts taking w∗ as given:
Π(w∗) ≡ sup
(h,a,θ)∈X
pi(h, a, θ;w∗) = pi(h∗f , a
∗
f , θ
∗
f ;w
∗), (3.7)
for almost all (h∗f , a
∗
f , θ
∗
f ) ∈ suppµB∗.
(ii) For each type s ∈ S, workers choose (h, a, θ) in X to maximize their expected utility taking w∗
as given:
υs(w
∗) ≡ sup
(h,a,θ)∈X
u(s, h, a, θ;w∗) = u(s, h∗s, a
∗
s, θ
∗
s ;w
∗), (3.8)
for almost all (s, h∗s, a∗s, θ∗s) ∈ suppµS∗.
Condition (i), together with the feasibility condition (3.1), implies that all the ﬁrms in the
economy choose their ex-ante investments and the markets they enter in order to maximize their
expected proﬁts taking wages as given. Note that market (h, a, θ) attracts some ﬁrms in equilibrium
whenever (h, a, θ) ∈ suppµB∗. Also, since they are ex-ante symmetric, ﬁrms make the same proﬁts
in all active markets. The ﬁrms' equilibrium proﬁts are denoted by Π(w∗). Condition (ii), combined
with the feasibility condition (3.2), is a similar optimization condition for each type of worker. In
this condition, υs(w∗) denotes the equilibrium indirect utility of a type-s worker. Market (h, a, θ)
attracts type-s workers in equilibrium whenever (s, h, a, θ) ∈ suppµS∗. Some workers/ﬁrms may not
to participate at all if that is optimal for them.
Finally, the rational expectations conditions on the agents' beliefs follows from the aggregate
feasibility condition (3.3) imposed on the equilibrium allocation. Note that (3.3) can be written as
∫
(h,a,θ)∈Ω
dµB(h, a, θ) =
∫
(h,a,θ)∈Ω
θdµSX(h, a, θ) for all Borel Ω ⊆ H ×A×<+, (3.9)
using (2.2), since α(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ <+. Condition (3.9) says that the total measures of workers
and ﬁrms who enter each active market in equilibrium generate the market tightness levels that
the traders take as given when they choose which market to join (as in directed search models).
Take, for instance, an allocation which implies an atomless assignment of workers and ﬁrms across
markets. In this case, dµB(h, a, θ) is the density of ﬁrms and dµSX(h, a, θ) is the density of workers
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in the set of active markets. If the traders' conjectures about the buyer-seller ratio θ are correct,
dµB(h, a, θ) should be equal to θdµSX(h, a, θ) in this set. This is what equation (3.9) says.
20 The
same interpretation applies if µB and µS have a mass point at (h, a, θ), except that in this case we
talk about positive masses rather than densities. Note that, if a given market attracts no traders,
(3.9) is vacuous since dµB(h, a, θ) = dµSX(h, a, θ) = 0. In other words, (3.9) is a restriction on active
markets only.
A standard feature of general equilibrium models with a continuum of commodities is that the
prices of those commodities which are not traded in equilibrium are indeterminate (e.g. see Mas-
Colell and Zame (1991) and Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999)). Note that, if a market is active in
our model, so (h, a, θ) ∈ suppµB ∩ suppµSX , the ﬁrm's optimality condition implies:
qf = α(θ) [f(h, a)− w∗(h, a, θ)]− C(a). (3.10)
Also, there is some buyer type s˜ who ﬁnds it optimal to invest in h and join this market:
qS(s˜) = m(θ) [w∗(h, a, θ)− v(s˜, h, a)]− c(s˜, h). (3.11)
Thus w∗(h, a, θ) jointly satisﬁes (3.10) and (3.11).
On the other hand, for those markets which are inactive, so (h, a, θ) /∈ suppµB ∩ suppµSX ,
w∗(h, a, θ) satisﬁes:
qf ≥ α(θ) [f(h, a)− w∗(h, a, θ)]− C(a), (3.12)
qS(s) ≥ m(θ) [w∗(h, a, θ)− v(s, h, a)]− c(s, h), ∀s ∈ S, (3.13)
the weak inequality signs being strict in the case of markets which ﬁrms (workers) strictly prefer
not to join. Hence, w∗(h, a, θ) satisﬁes:21
f(h, a)− C(a) + q
f
α(θ)
≤ w∗(h, a, θ) ≤ inf
s∈S
{v(s, h, a) + q
S(s) + c(s, h)
m(θ)
}. (3.14)
20Formally, (3.9) says that the restriction of µB toH×A×<+ is absolutely continuous with respect to the restriction
of µSX to the same set, the corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivative being f(h, a, θ) = θ.
21We are abusing notation slightly here since, strictly speaking, condition (3.12) applies only when θ > 0 (because
α(0) = 0) . Yet when θ = 0, (3.12) holds trivially, so the lower bound on (3.12) can be ignored.
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The term in the left-hand side of (3.14) is the highest wage ﬁrms would be willing to pay to
participate in this market in equilibrium. The term in the right-hand side of (3.14) is the lowest
wage that a worker would accept to participate in this market in equilibrium. A market is inactive
whenever the latter term exceeds the former (since opening such a market would imply negative
gains from trade). In this case, the wage in this market is indeterminate. It could be as low as
f(h, a)− C(a)+qfα(θ) , as high as infs∈S{v(s, h, a) + q
S(s)+c(s,h)
m(θ) , or anything in between. All these prices
are consistent with the market being inactive.22 It is common in the general equilibrium literature
to use conventions which allow to select a unique supporting price system. We present an example
in Section 5.1 below.
4 Welfare and existence theorems via Linear programming
The purpose of this section is to bring to light the connection between the planner's LP problem and
competitive search equilibria. In doing so, we follow Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, 1999) and
Makowski and Ostroy (1996). We begin by exploiting a well-known duality result in mathematics.
Namely, the fact that any linear programming problem has a dual problem, which is also linear.
Whereas the planner's problem is a maximization problem which will be referred to as the primal
problem, its dual is a minimization problem. The two problems are related because, as we shall
see, (a) their optimal values coincide and (b) the dual variables are the shadow prices of the primal
constraints and vice versa.23
The primal problem is to ﬁnd (µB, µS) ∈Mc+(X)×Mc+(S ×X) to solve
(P ) sup
∫
X [α(θ)f(h, a) − C(a)]dµB(h, a, θ) −
∫
S×X [m(θ)v(s, h, a) + c(s, h)]dµ
S(s, h, a, θ)
22A related issue arises in directed search models where out-of-equilibrium beliefs are indeterminate (see Peters
(1997)). These models impose reﬁnements to pin down the equilibrium beliefs. For a detailed discussion between the
relation between the two equilibrium concepts and the two indeterminacies, see Jerez (2014).
23It is well-known in the mathematical optimization literature that, unlike a ﬁnite dimensional LP problem, an
inﬁnite dimensional LP problem and its dual need not have the same value, and that optimal solutions to these
problems may fail to exist. Below we show that the problems in this paper are well-behaved.
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s.t.
µB(X) = ξˆ, (4.1)
µSS = ξ
S , (4.2)∫
(h,a,θ)∈Ω
α(θ)dµB(h, a, θ) =
∫
(h,a,θ)∈Ω
m(θ)dµSX(h, a, θ) for all Borel Ω ⊂ X, (4.3)
µB, µS ≥ 0. (4.4)
There is a slight diﬀerence between problem (P ) and the planner's problem described in Section 3,
in that the constraint system (4.3) extends the matching condition (3.3) to the ﬁctitious market x0.
Replacing (3.3) with (4.3) is convenient for our purposes and does not change the problem. Since
m(θ0) = α(θ0) = 0, (4.3) is vacuous when θ = θ0.
Let qf ∈ < denote the dual variable associated with constraint (4.1). In the Appendix we
show that the dual variables associated with the constraint systems (4.2) and (4.3) are given by two
continuous functions: qS ∈ C(S) and w ∈ C(X), respectively.24 As we shall see, the dual variable qf
measures the shadow value of having (a small mass of) additional ﬁrms enter the economy, whereas
qS(s) is the corresponding shadow value for workers of type-s. In the terminology of Ostroy (1980,
1984) and Makowski (1980), qf represents the marginal product (or marginal contribution to social
welfare) of a ﬁrm, and qS(s) is the marginal product of a type-s worker.
We abuse notation slightly by denoting the dual variable associated with (4.3) by w, which is
also how we denote the market wage function. This is to emphasize the relationship between both
functions. Recall that condition (4.3) says that the total number of jobs created in each market is
equal to the total number of workers who ﬁnd a job in that market. In our model, the dual variable
w(h, a, θ) measures the shadow value of a job when the worker has attributes h, the employer has
attributes a and the job is created in market with tightness θ. In particular, the presence of search
frictions implies that the shadow price of a job (just like market wages) depends not only on the
job's description but also on corresponding the market tightness level.
24qS and w lie in the topological duals of the spaces M(S) and Mc(X) (as these are the spaces where the measures
ξS and µB lie). Since C(S) is endowed with the uniform norm topology and C(X) is endowed with the topology of
uniform convergence on compact sets, M(S) and Mc(X) are the respective topological duals of these spaces. When
M(S) and Mc(X) are endowed with the weak-star topology, the converse statement also holds.
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The Lagrangian associated with problem (P ) is
L =
∫
X
[α(θ)f(h, a)− C(a)]dµB(h, a, θ)−
∫
S×X
[m(θ)v(s, h, a) + c(s, h)]dµS(s, h, a, θ)
+qf [ξˆ −
∫
X
dµB(h, a, θ)] +
∫
S
qS(s)
[
dξS(s)− dµSS(s)
]
+
∫
X
w(h, a, θ)m(θ)dµSX(h, a, θ)−
∫
X
w(h, a, θ)α(θ)dµB(h, a, θ),
where we set w(x0) = 0 without loss of generality (since m(θ0) = α(θ0) = 0). The Lagrangian can
be rearranged as follows:
L = qf ξˆ +
∫
S
qS(s)dξS(s)−
∫
X
(
qf − α(θ)[f(h, a)− w(h, a, θ)] + C(a)
)
dµB(h, a, θ)
−
∫
S×X
(
qS(s)−m(θ)[w(h, a, θ)− v(s, h, a)] + c(s, h)) dµS(s, h, a, θ).
Finally, we may use the payoﬀ functions of ﬁrms and workers, pi(h, a, θ;w) and u(s, h, a, θ;w), deﬁned
in (3.5) and (3.6) to write:
L = qf ξˆ +
∫
S
qS(s)dξS(s)−
∫
X
[qf − pi(h, a, θ;w)]dµB(h, a, θ) (4.5)
−
∫
S×X
[
qS(s)− u(s, h, a, θ;w)] dµS(s, h, a, θ).
The dual problem (D) is to ﬁnd (qf , qS , w) ∈ < × C(S)× C(X) to solve
(D) inf qf ξˆ +
∫
S q
S(s)dξS(s)
s.t.
qf ≥ pi(h, a, θ;w) for all (h, a, θ) ∈ X, (4.6)
qS(s) ≥ u(s, h, a, θ;w) for all (s, h, a, θ) ∈ S ×X. (4.7)
It is easy to see that problem (D) is linear, once it is noted thatbecause utility is transferable
w enters linearly the payoﬀ functions pi(h, a, θ) and u(s, h, a, θ). The linear constraint systems (4.6)
and (4.7) have the following interpretation. The term in the right-hand side of (4.6) gives the ﬁrms'
expected proﬁts in each market (h, a, θ) ∈ X as a function of the shadow price of the jobs created
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in that market, w(h, a, θ). Constraint (4.6) says that qf ought to be an upper bound for the ﬁrms'
expected proﬁts in all markets. Similarly, (4.7) says that qS(s) is an upper bound for the expected
utility of a type-s worker in the diﬀerent markets (given the shadow price of the jobs created in
those markets).
The above implies that the dual constraint systems (4.6) and (4.7) can also be written as
qf ≥ Π(w) (4.8)
qS(s) ≥ υs(w) for all s ∈ S, (4.9)
where Π(w) is the ﬁrms' proﬁt function, and υs(w) is the indirect utility function of type-s workers
in Deﬁnition 2. Because the objective of problem (D) is to minimize qf ξˆ +
∫
S q
S(s)dξS(s), (4.8)
and (4.9) bind at an optimum. Thus, the optimal value of w minimizes the sum of ﬁrms' proﬁts
and the indirect utilities of all the workers who live in the economy:
wo = arg
{
min
w∈C(X)
[
qfΠ(w) +
∫
S
υs(w)dξ
S(s)
]}
. (4.10)
The optimal values of qf and qS in turn give ﬁrms' proﬁts and the workers' indirect utilities at
prices wo: qfo = Π(wo) and qSo(s) = υs(wo).25
Denote the optimal values for problems (P ) and (D) by ν(P ) and ν(D), respectively. Theorem 1
states that these problems have optimal solutions and the same optimal value. This in turn implies
that the dual variables are indeed the shadow prices of the primal constraints, and vice versa.
Theorem 1. Problems (P ) and (D) have optimal solutions, and ν(P ) = ν(D).
We may then appeal to the complementary slackness theorem of linear programming to charac-
terize optimal solutions for problems (P ) and (D) (see Anderson and Nash 1987, Theorem 3.2).
Theorem 2. (Complementary Slackness Theorem) Feasible solutions (µB, µS) and (qf , qS , w) for
25Makowski and Ostroy (1996) show how the fact that the constraints of the dual problem can be incorporated into
the objective function is characteristic of the LP version of general equilibrium. They make this point in the context
of a frictionless exchange economies with transferable utility and a ﬁnite number of divisible goods. In the Appendix,
we show that feasible dual solutions satisfy qf ≥ 0 and qS ≥ 0, so individual rationality holds (see Lemma A.2). This
is indeed a general property of the LP formulation of Makowski and Ostroy (1996) and Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame
(1992, 1999), where individual rationality constraints appear in the dual (rather than in the primal problem). We
also show that w ≥ 0 without loss of generality.
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problems (P ) and (D) are optimal if and only if they satisfy the complementary slackness conditions:
qf = pi(hf , af , θf ;w) for almost all (hf , af , θf ) ∈ suppµB, (4.11)
qS(s) = u(s, hs, as, θs;w) for almost all (s, hs, as, θs) ∈ suppµS . (4.12)
As in Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992) and Makowski and Ostroy (1996), the complementary
slackness theorem allows to establish the equivalence between constrained eﬃcient allocations and
competitive equilibria. Speciﬁcally, Theorem 2 implies that equilibrium allocations coincide with
the optimal solutions to problem (P ), whereas the ﬁrms' proﬁts, the workers' indirect utilities and
the wages in equilibrium coincide with the optimal solutions to problem (D).
Theorem 3. (Decentralization of constrained eﬃcient allocations)
(I) Let (µB∗, µS∗, w∗) be a competitive equilibrium. Deﬁne qf∗ = Π(w∗) and qS∗(s) = υs(w∗) for
each s ∈ S. Then (µB∗, µS∗) solves problem (P ), and (qf∗, qS∗, w∗) solves problem (D).
(II) Suppose (µBo, µSo) and (qfo, qSo, wo) are optimal solutions for problems (P ) and (D). Then
(µBo, µSo, wo) is a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, qfo gives the ﬁrms' equilibrium proﬁts
and qSo(s) gives the equilibrium indirect utilities of type-s workers.
According to Theorem 2, an allocation (µB, µS) is constrained eﬃcient if it is feasible and there
exists shadow prices (qf , qS , w) which satisfy the dual feasibility constraints (4.6) and (4.7) and the
complementary slackness conditions (4.11) and (4.12). Yet (4.6) and (4.11) are equivalent to the
ﬁrms' proﬁt maximization condition in the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium (condition (i)).
Indeed, (4.6) and (4.11) say that the measure µB assigns ﬁrms to market (hf , af , θf ) if and only if
entering such a market is a proﬁt maximizing choice for ﬁrms at wages w. The optimal value of qf
then gives the ﬁrms' proﬁts in equilibrium. Similarly, (4.7) and (4.12) are equivalent of condition
(ii) in Deﬁnition 1, since they say that µS assigns type-s workers to market (hs, as, θs) if and only
if participating in this market is an optimal choice for these workers given w. Hence, the optimal
value of qS(s) gives the indirect utility of type-s workers in equilibrium. Finally, the optimal value
of w describes the transfers that ﬁrms need to pay workers in each market in order to decentralize
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the allocation (µB, µS).26
The existence of a competitive equilibrium follows directly from Theorem 1 and Part II in
Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. A competitive equilibrium exists.
5 Extensions and discussion
There are several variants of the model presented so far that involve straightforward variations of
the linear programming formulation in Section 4, and where essentially the same argument allows
to establish the equivalent constrained eﬃciency and existence results. Here we brieﬂy discuss two
of them: the variant of the model with free entry, and the more general model where ﬁrms are
heterogeneous ex-ante.
5.1 Free entry
With free entry of ﬁrms, the feasibility constraint (4.1) disappears, as the mass of ﬁrms that enter
the economy is now endogenous. Also, an entry cost κ is typically introduced, and so the ﬁrms'
proﬁts are now given by:
pi(h, a, θ;w) = α(θ) [f(h, a)− w(h, a, θ)]− C(a)− κ. (5.1)
Apart from this, the only other change in the deﬁnition of a competitive search equilibrium is that
the zero proﬁt condition must hold: Π(w∗) is set to zero in condition (i). In terms of the linear
programming formulation, eliminating constraint (4.1) from the primal is essentially equivalent to
setting qf = 0 in the dual problem. In proving the constrained eﬃciency and existence results,
virtually the same arguments go through.
26To be precise, one also needs to show is that the function υs(w
∗) is continuous in s, so it lies in the same space
as the dual variable qS . This follows trivially from Berge's Maximum Theorem since condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 1
implies
υs(w
∗) ≡ sup
(h,a,θ)∈suppµS∗
X
u(s, h, a, θ;w∗) = u(s, h∗s , a
∗
s , θ
∗
s ;w
∗), (4.13)
u is continuous, and, because µS∗ has compact support, so does µS∗X .
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The free entry assumption highly simpliﬁes the model when ﬁrms are ex-ante symmetric. For
instance, one may tackle the price indeterminacy by selecting the highest prices that support the
equilibrium allocation. In our model this is equivalent to selecting a supporting wage function which
satisﬁes
w(h, a, θ) = f(h, a)− C(a) + κ
α(θ)
. (5.2)
At these prices, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts in all markets, whether active or not.27 The reason why this
selection criterion is particularly useful is that it directly pins down the equilibrium wage function.
5.2 Two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity
Consider a generalization of the model in Sections 2-4 where ﬁrms are of diﬀerent types b ∈ B
(and B is an arbitrary compact metric space). The population of ﬁrms is described by a measure
ξB ∈ M+(B) with full support. Let Cˆ(b, a) denote the cost of investing in a ∈ A for a type-b ﬁrm,
where Cˆ is continuous and Cˆ(·, a0) = 0. The output generated by a type-b ﬁrms which invest in
a and hires a worker who invest in h is fˆ(b, h, a). The worker's disutility of labor may depend on
some of the exogenous characteristics of the ﬁrms they work for (e.g. such as sector), and is denoted
by vˆ(s, b, h, a). Suppose that, for each ﬁrm type b ∈ B, there is an investment a by the ﬁrm, a
worker type s ∈ S and a choice of h ∈ H by the latter that generates a positive bilateral surplus:
fˆ(b, h, a)− Cˆ(b, a)− c(s, h)− vˆ(s, b, h, a) > 0.
In this version of the model, jobs are described by a triple (b, h, a) ∈ B×H ×A. As before, the
description of a market further includes the associated degree of trading uncertainty, as described
by the corresponding tightness level θ. A market is thus represented by an element (b, h, a, θ) ∈
B×H ×A×<+. The set of markets that can potentially be active is Xˆ = {B×H ×A×<+}∪ xˆ0,
where xˆ0 represents non-participation.
Let wˆ(b, h, a, θ) denote the wage in market (b, h, a, θ), where wˆ(xˆ0) = 0. Consistency requires
that only type-b ﬁrms who invest in a ∈ A participate in this market, their expected payoﬀ being
pˆi(b, h, a, θ; wˆ) = α(θ)
[
fˆ(b, h, a)− wˆ(b, h, a, θ)
]
− Cˆ(b, a). (5.3)
27The reﬁnement on out-of-equilibrium beliefs which is typically imposed in directed search models has precisely
this same implication. Such a reﬁnement is the equivalent of this price selection criterion.
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Similarly, only workers who invest on h are allowed to participate in this market, their expected
payoﬀ being a function of the worker's type s:
uˆ(s, b, h, a, θ; wˆ) = m(θ) [wˆ(b, h, a, θ)− vˆ(s, b, h, a)]− c(s, h). (5.4)
5.2.1 General equilibrium model
As before, an allocation assigns ﬁrms and workers of diﬀerent types across markets. Formally, an
allocation is described by a pair (µˆB, µˆS) ∈ Mc+(Xˆ) ×Mc+(S × Xˆ). In particular, µˆB(Ωˆ) is the
measure of ﬁrms assigned to an arbitrary Borel set of markets Ωˆ ⊆ Xˆ (i.e., the aggregate labor
demand in these markets).
Feasibility requires that the total measure of ﬁrms of a given type b who are assigned under
an allocation be equal to the measure of such types who are present in the population. So (4.1) is
replaced by µˆBB = ξ
B. The second feasibility constraint (3.2) is essentially unaltered (except for the
fact that X has been replaced by Xˆ): µˆSS = ξ
S . The third feasibility constraint, which says that the
total number of jobs created in an arbitrary set of markets is equal to the total number of workers
who ﬁnd a job in those markets, is a simple variant of (3.3):
∫
(b,h,a,θ)∈Ωˆ
α(θ)dµˆB(b, h, a, θ) =
∫
(b,h,a,θ)∈Ωˆ
m(θ)dµˆS
Xˆ
(b, h, a, θ) for all Borel Ωˆ ⊆ B×H×A×<+.
(5.5)
In the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium, the only substantial change regards condition (i),
which now says that all ﬁrm types b ∈ B make proﬁt maximizing choices.
Deﬁnition 2. A competitive search equilibrium is a feasible allocation (µˆB, µˆS) ∈Mc+(Xˆ)×Mc+(S×
Xˆ) and a wage function wˆ∗ ∈ C+(Xˆ) such that:
(i) For almost all (b, h∗f , a
∗
f , θ
∗
f ) ∈ suppµˆB∗,
Πˆb(wˆ
∗) ≡ sup
(h,a,θ)∈H×A×Θ
pˆi(b, h, a, θ; wˆ∗) = pˆi(b, h∗f , a
∗
f , θ
∗
f ; wˆ
∗), (5.6)
where Πˆb denotes the proﬁt function of a type-b ﬁrm.
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(ii) For almost all (s, b∗s, h∗s, a∗s, θ∗s) ∈ suppµS∗.
υs(w
∗) ≡ sup
(b,h,a,θ)∈X
u(s, h, a, θ;w∗) = u(s, b∗s, h
∗
s, a
∗
s, θ
∗
s ;w
∗). (5.7)
Again, the feasibility condition (5.5) implies a rational expectations condition on equilibrium
beliefs:
∫
(b,h,a,θ)∈Ωˆ
dµˆB(b, h, a, θ) =
∫
(b,h,a,θ)∈Ωˆ
θdµˆS
Xˆ
(b, h, a, θ) for all Borel Ωˆ ⊆ B×H×A×<+. (5.8)
(The interpretation of this condition is essentially as before).
5.2.2 LP formulation and main results
The primal LP problem in this general model is to ﬁnd (µˆB, µˆS) ∈Mc+(Xˆ)×Mc+(S × Xˆ) to solve
(PG) sup
∫
Xˆ [α(θ)fˆ(b, h, a)− Cˆ(b, a)]dµˆB −
∫
S×Xˆ [m(θ)vˆ(s, b, h, a) + c(s, h)]dµˆ
S s.t.
µˆBB = ξ
B, (5.9)
µˆSS = ξ
S , (5.10)∫
Ωˆ
α(θ)dµˆB =
∫
Ωˆ
m(θ)dµˆSX for all Borel Ωˆ ⊆ Xˆ, (5.11)
µˆB, µˆS ≥ 0, (5.12)
where (as before) the objective function describes the economy's total welfare.
The shadow price of constraint (5.9) (rather than a real number) is a continuous function qˆB ∈
C(B). This function describes the marginal contribution to social welfare of the diﬀerent ﬁrm types.
The spaces where the other dual variables lie are essentially unaltered (except that, since X has
been replaced by Xˆ, the shadow price of constraint (5.11) now lies in C(Xˆ)).
The dual problem (DG) is to ﬁnd (qˆB, qˆS , wˆ) ∈ C(B)× C(S)× C(Xˆ) to solve
(DG) inf
∫
B qˆ
B(b)dξB(b) +
∫
S qˆ
S(s)dξS(s)
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s.t.
qˆB(b) ≥ pˆi(b, h, a, θ; wˆ) for all (b, h, a, θ) ∈ Xˆ, (5.13)
qˆS(s) ≥ uˆ(s, b, h, a, θ; wˆ) for all (s, b, h, a, θ) ∈ S × Xˆ. (5.14)
One can again show that problems (PG) and (DG) have optimal solutions and the same optimal
value. The proof of this result is a simple variant of that of Theorem 2 in Jerez (2014), which
(for completeness) is presented in the Appendix.28 In the light of this result, it is direct to show
that the complementary slackness theorem again implies an equivalence between competitive search
equilibria and the optimal solutions to the LP problems, and the existence of a competitive search
equilibrium.
Appendix A
A.1 Notation
We begin with some preliminary notation.
Take a metric space Z which is locally compact and separable. Let C(Z) denote the space
of continuous real-valued functions on Z, endowed with the topology of uniform convergence on
compact sets. The topological dual of C(Z) is the space Mc(Z) of signed regular Borel measures
on Z with compact support (see Hewitt (1959)). We let Mc(Z) be endowed with the weak-star
topology, so C(Z) is also the dual of Mc(Z). The dual pair of spaces (C(Z),Mc(Z)) is endowed
with the standard bilinear form:
〈f, γ〉 =
∫
z∈Z
f(z)dγ(z), f ∈ C(Z), γ ∈Mc(Z),
where the bracket notation highlights the inﬁnite dimensional nature of the spaces in the pairing.
In the special case where Z is compact, the topological dual of C(Z) is the spaceM(Z) of signed
regular Borel measures on Z.29 (If Z is ﬁnite, both C(Z) andM(Z) are isomorphic to the Euclidean
space). We write C+(Z), Mc+(Z) and M+(Z) for the positive cones of the three spaces.
For any integer n, the product spaces
∏
j=1,...,nC(Zj) and
∏
j=1,...,nMc(Zj) are endowed with
28The argument is slightly diﬀerent from that in Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1992) and Makowski and Ostroy
(1996) mainly because, unlike in their papers, the measures describing an allocation are deﬁned over a non-compact
set.
29As noted by Hewitt (1959), the topology of uniform convergence on compact sets coincides with the uniform
norm topology in this case.
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the corresponding product topologies, and are also paired in duality with bilinear form:
n∑
j=1
〈fj , γj〉, (f1, f2, . . . , fn) ∈
∏
j=1,...,n
C(Zj), (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn) ∈
∏
j=1,...,n
Mc(Zj).
A.2 The primal and dual linear programming problems
This section includes the formal description of the primal and dual LP problems in Section 5.2. To
simplify notation, we drop all the hats (that were used in the production and cost functions and
in all the variables to diﬀerentiate that Section from the model in Section 3).
Before stating the primal problem, a remark about constraint (5.5) is in order. We have written
this constraint as:∫
(b,h,a,θ)∈Ω
α(θ)dµB(b, h, a, θ) =
∫
(b,h,a,θ)∈Ω
m(θ)dµSX(b, h, a, θ) for all Borel Ω ⊂ X
where X ≡ (B×H×A×<+)∪{x0}. The left-hand side of this constraint describes a measure which
is absolutely continuous with respect to µB with Radon-Nikodym derivative α˜(b, a, h, θ) = α(θ).
Similarly, the right-hand side of (4.3) describes a measure which is absolutely continuous with
respect to µSX with Radon-Nikodym derivative m˜(b, a, h, θ) = m(θ). Constraint (4.3) says that
these two measures, which lie inMc(X) and which we denote by η(α˜, µB) and η(p˜i, µSX) respectively,
are equal:
η(α˜, µB) = η(m˜, µSX).
Using the standard (compact) notation, the primal problem is to ﬁnd x = (µB, µS) ∈Mc(X)×
Mc(S ×X) to solve
(PG) sup 〈x, c〉
s.t. Ax = b,
x ≥ 0.
Here c = (cB, cS) ∈ C(X)× C(S ×X) where
cB(b, h, a, θ) = α(θ)f(b, h, a)− C(b, a)
cS(s, b, h, a, θ) = −m(θ)v(s, b, h, a)− c(s, h).
Also, b = (ξB, ξS , 0) ∈ M(B) ×M(S) ×Mc(X). Finally, A : Mc(X) ×Mc(S × X) → M(B) ×
M(S)×Mc(X) is a continuous linear map deﬁned by
A(µB, µS) =
(
µBB, µ
S
S , η(α˜, µ
B)− η(m˜, µSX)
)
.
Formally, problem (P ) is an equality constrained LP problem (see Anderson and Nash 1987).
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The dual problem is to ﬁnd y = (qB, qS , w) ∈ C(B)× C(S)× C(X) to solve
(DG) inf 〈b, y〉
s.t. A∗y ≥ c,
where A∗ : C(B) × C(S) × C(X) → C(X) × C(S ×X) is the adjoint of A. That is, A∗ is deﬁned
by the relation
〈x, (A∗y)〉 = 〈Ax, y〉, for all x ∈Mc(X)×Mc(S ×X) and all y ∈ C(B)× C(S)× C(X).
This is precisely the dual problem stated in Section 5.2.
A.3 Existence of optimal solutions and absence of a duality gap
In this section we prove that problems (PG) and (D)G have optimal solutions and the same optimal
value: ν(PG) = ν(DG) (i.e., the general version of Theorem 1). In doing so, we rely on the
assumptions that f , v, C and c and the matching function M are continuous, and B, S, H and
A are compact sets. This, combined with the fact that trading probabilities are bounded, is all we
need to prove these results.
We begin by showing that both problems are consistent (i.e. their feasible sets are not empty)
and bounded (i.e. ν(PG) and ν(DG) are ﬁnite).
Lemma A. 1. Problems (PG) and (DG) are consistent and bounded.
Proof. An allocation where workers make no investments (so they all choose h = h0), neither do
ﬁrms (who choose a = a0) and all agents are assigned to a ﬁctitious market where θ = θ0 is a
feasible solution for problem (PG). Hence, problem (PG) is consistent. Also, since total welfare is
zero under autarky, ν(PG) ≥ 0.
In problem (DG), set w = w1 ∈ C(X) where w1(b, h, a, θ) = 0 for all (b, h, a, θ) ∈ X. In the
constraint systems (4.6) and (4.7), α(θ) and m(θ) are bounded above by one and below by zero
(since they are probabilities). One then can ﬁnd a feasible dual solution where w = w1 by choosing
qB1 ∈ C(B) and qS1 ∈ C(S) constant so that
qB1 (b) = q¯
B
1 ≡ sup
(b,h,a)∈B×H×A
f(b, h, a)− C(b, a) +  > 0,
qS1 (s) = , s ∈ S,
where  is a positive real number. Since f and C are continuous and B×H×A is compact, the above
supremum q¯B1 is attained. So problem (DG) is consistent. (The supremum q¯B1 is clearly positive: we
have assumed that for each ﬁrm type b there is a value of a, a value of h and a worker type s such
that f(b, h, a)− C(b, a)− c(s, h)− v(s, b, h, a) > 0, and so f(b, h, a)− C(b, a) > 0). Moreover,
ν(DG) ≤
∫
B
qB1 (b)dξ
B(b) +
∫
S
qS1 (s)dξ
S(s) = q¯B1 ξ
B(B) + ξS(S) <∞.
Finally, by the weak duality theorem (Anderson and Nash 1987, Theorem 2.1), ν(PG) ≤ ν(DG),
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so the primal and dual problems are bounded:
0 ≤ ν(PG) ≤ ν(DG) ≤ q¯B1 ξB(B) + ξS(S) <∞.
Next, we show that problem (PG) is solvable.
Theorem A. 1. Problem (PG) has optimal solutions.
Proof. The feasible set of problem (PG) is bounded, and the constraint map and objective function
are weak-star continuous, so the result follows from Theorem 3.20 in Anderson and Nash (1987).
We also show that problems (PG) and (DG) have the same optimal value.
Theorem A. 2. There is no duality gap: ν(PG) = ν(DG).
Proof. The positive cone of C(X) × C(S × X) has a non-empty interior, denoted by Y0. Also,
(qB1 , qS1 , w1) ∈ C+(B)×C+(S)×C+(X) in the proof of Lemma A.1 is a Slater point in the feasible
set of problem (DG). Since ν(DG) is ﬁnite, Theorem 3.13 in Anderson and Nash (1987) implies
that ν(PG) = ν(DG).
We still need to show that problem (DG) is solvable. We begin by stating two preliminary results.
Lemma A.2 shows that the set of feasible dual solutions can be taken to be bounded without loss
of generality. The proof uses the fact that f, v, c and C are continuous, α and m are bounded, and
B, S, H and A are compact sets. Lemma A.3 shows that the tightness level θ can be restricted
without loss of generality to lie on a compact subset of <+ (e.g. to be bounded above).
Lemma A. 2. The set of feasible dual solutions can be taken to be bounded without loss of generality.
In particular, feasible dual solutions satisfy qB ≥ 0 and qS ≥ 0. Also, we may assume that qB and
qS are bounded above and that
min
(s,b,h,a)∈S×B×H×A
v(s, b, h, a) ≤ w(b, h, a, θ) ≤ max
(b,h,a)∈B×H×A
f(b, h, a) for all (b, h, a, θ) ∈ X.
Proof. Substituting (5.3) into the dual constraint system (5.13) and setting θ = θ0, h = h0 and
a = a0 implies that qB ≥ 0. Likewise, substituting (5.4) into the dual constraint system (5.14) and
setting θ = θ0, h = h0 and a = a0 implies that qS ≥ 0.
For a given (b, h, a, θ) ∈ B ×H × A × <++, if an optimal primal solution satisﬁes (b, h, a, θ) ∈
suppµB then (s˜, b, h, a, θ) ∈ suppµS for some s˜ ∈ S. This is because the restrictions of µB and µSX to
B×H×A×<++ are mutually absolutely continuous measures, and so they have the same support.30
(There is always such a (b, h, a, θ), when one focuses on the interesting case where autarky is not an
30The corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivatives are f and 1/f where f(b, h, a, θ) = θ. This follows from equations
(2.2) and (3.3) since α(θ),m(θ) > 0 for all θ > 0.
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optimal allocation.) By the complementary slackness theorem, in this case, optimal dual solutions
satisfy
qB(b) = α(θ) [f(b, h, a)− w(b, h, a, θ)]− C(b, a), (A.1)
qS(s˜) = m(θ) [w(b, h, a, θ)− v(s˜, b, h, a)]− c(s˜, h). (A.2)
Now, since qB(b), qS(s˜) ≥ 0 and α(θ),m(θ) > 0 (and C and c are also positive functions), it follows
that v(s˜, b, h, a) ≤ w(b, h, a, θ) ≤ f(b, h, a). Hence,
0 ≤ inf
s∈S
v(s, b, h, a) ≤ w(b, h, a, θ) ≤ f(b, h, a). (A.3)
The continuity of v and the compactness of S imply that the inﬁmum in (A.3) is attained. Since
w is continuous, (A.3) also holds for (b, h, a, 0) ∈ X. Equation (A.3), together with (5.3) and (5.4),
in turn implies that the terms on right-hand side of (5.13) and (5.14) are bounded above (since
matching probabilities are bounded, f , v, c and C are continuous functions, and B, S, A and H are
compact). So there is no loss of generality in assuming that qB and qS are bounded above.
On the other hand, if (b, h, a, θ) /∈ suppµB then (b, h, a, θ) /∈ suppµSX . In this case, market
(b, h, a, θ) is inactive, and its shadow price w(b, h, a, θ) can be chosen arbitrarily among all the
values that satisfy
qB(b) ≥ α(θ) [f(b, h, a)− w(b, h, a, θ)]− C(b, a), (A.4)
qS(s) ≥ m(θ) [w(b, h, a, θ)− v(s, b, h, a)]− c(s, h) ∀s ∈ S. (A.5)
In particular, we may restrict without loss of generality to values of w(b, h, a, θ) satisfying (A.3).
Indeed, if (A.4) and (A.5) hold for w(b, h, a, θ) > f(b, h, a) then they must hold for w(b, h, a, θ) =
f(b, h, a) since qB(b) ≥ 0. Likewise, if these equations hold for w(b, h, a, θ) < v(s, b, h, a) =
mins∈S v(s, b, h, a) then they must also hold for w(b, h, a, θ) = v(s, b, h, a) since qS ≥ 0. Finally,
since (A.3) holds for all (b, h, a, θ) ∈ X and (again B, S, A, and H are compact and f and v are
continuous functions),
min
(s,b,h,a)∈S×B×H×A
v(s, b, h, a) ≤ w(b, h, a, θ) ≤ max
(b,h,a)∈B×H×A
f(b, h, a), ∀(b, h, a, θ) ∈ X. (A.6)
Lemma A. 3. There exists a suﬃciently large θ¯ ∈ <+ such that, if all the constraints which are
associated with elements θ > θ¯ are eliminated from problem (DG), the set of optimal dual solutions
does not change.
Proof. Suppose the statement in Lemma A.3 were not true. Let (µB, µS) be an optimal primal
solution. Take an increasing sequence {θj} ⊂ <+ with θj → ∞. For each j there then exists
(bj , hj , aj , θˆj) ∈ suppµB with θˆj > θj . Equivalently, (sj , bj , hj , aj , θˆj) ∈ suppµS for some sj ∈ S,
since the restrictions of µB and µSX to B × H × A × <++ are mutually exclusive measures which
have the same support. (If not, the complementary slackness theorem would imply that the dual
constraints associated to all θ > θj can be ignored without loss of generality, since they do not bind).
But then the support of µB contains the sequence {(bj , hj , aj , θˆj)} where lim θˆj → ∞, leading to a
contradiction since this support is compact by deﬁnition.
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The solvability of problem (DG) cannot be settled using an argument similar to that in Theorem
A.1 because the space of continuous functions on a compact set is not the dual of any normed
space. We follow the approach used in Anderson and Nash (1987) for the continuous transportation
problem (see their Theorem 5.2) and repose problem (DG) in an enlarged space which does have
this property. Then we appeal to the continuity of the f , v, C and c and the matching function,
and the compactness of B, H and A to show that an optimal solution in the enlarged space lies in
the original space.
Theorem A. 3. Problem (DG) has optimal solutions.
Proof. Let us repose problem (DG) with (qB, qS , w) in L∞(ξB) × L∞(ξS) × L∞(µB), where µB is
optimal for problem (P ). (This space is the dual of L1(ξB) × L1(ξS) × L1(µB)). The new dual
problem is solvable by Theorem 3.20 in Anderson and Nash (1987) since Lemma A.2 implies that
its feasible set can be taken to be bounded without loss of generality.
We now show that there exists an optimal solution of this new problem where the functions
qB, qS and w are continuous. Suppose (qB, qS , w) is optimal for the new dual problem. Feasibility
requires that
α(θ)w(b, h, a, θ) ≥ α(θ)f(b, h, a)− C(b, a)− qB(b), ∀(b, h, a, θ) ∈ B ×H ×A×<+, (A.7)
and that
qS(s)+m(θ)v(s, b, h, a)+c(s, h) ≥ m(θ)w(b, h, a, θ), ∀(s, b, h, a, θ) ∈ S×B×H×A×<+. (A.8)
Recall that w(·, θ0) = 0. Deﬁne w2 ∈ L∞(µB) so
m(θ)w2(b, h, a, θ) = inf
s∈S
{
qS(s) +m(θ)v(s, b, h, a) + c(s, h)
}
(A.9)
for (b, h, a, θ) ∈ B ×H ×A×<+, and w2(·, θ0) = 0. Then, (qB, qS , w2) is another optimal solution.
We now show that the restriction of w2 to B ×H × A × (0, θ¯] is continuous. Take a sequence
{si} in S such that (qS(si) + m(θ)v(si, b, h, a) + c(si, h)) converges to α(θ)w2(b, h, a, θ). Since
B×H×A×[0, θ¯] is compact,m(θ)v(s, b, h, a)+c(s, h) is uniformly continuous on B×S×H×A×[0, θ¯].
For any  > 0 there then exists δ such that
|m(θ)v(si, b, h, a) + c(si, h)−m(θ′)v(si, b′, h′, a′)− c(si, h′)| < , i = 1, 2, . . . (A.10)
whenever (b′, h′, a′, θ′) lies in a δ-neighborhood of (b, h, a, θ), and both elements lie in B ×H ×A×
[0, θ¯]. Equations (A.8) and (A.10) then imply that
m(θ′)w2(b′, h′, a′, θ′) ≤ qS(si) +m(θ′)v(si, b′, h′, a′) + c(si, h′) (A.11)
< qS(si) +m(θ)v(si, b, h, a) + c(si, h) + , i = 1, 2, 3, . . . (A.12)
Taking the limit yields
m(θ′)w2(b′, h′, a′, θ′)−  ≤ α(θ)w2(b, h, a, θ). (A.13)
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A symmetric argument implies that
m(θ)w2(b, h, a, θ)−  ≤ α(θ′)w2(b′, h′, a′, θ′). (A.14)
for any such (b′, h′, a′, θ′) and (b, h, a, θ). Hence, the restriction of α(θ)w2(b, h, a, θ) to B×H ×A×
[0, θ¯] is continuous. Since m is continuous and strictly positive when θ ∈ (0, θ¯], the restriction of
w2(b, h, a, θ) to B ×H ×A× (0, θ¯] (the quotient of two continuous functions) is continuous.
To see that w2 is continuous, take an increasing sequence of compact sets {Θj} converging to
Θ ∪ {θ0}; e.g. Θj = [j , θj ] ∪ {θ0} with j ↓ 0 and kj ↑ ∞. Consider the sequence of functions {fj}
where fj = χΘjw2, where χΘj denotes the characteristic function on Θj (so w2 and fj coincide on
Θj). Since fj is continuous on Θj and w2 = limj→∞ fj , it follows that w2 is continuous.
Finally, deﬁning
qB2 (b) = max
(h,a,θ)∈H×A×([0,θ¯]∪{θ0})
α(θ) [f(b, h, a)− w2(b, h, a, θ)]− C(b, a), (A.15)
qS2 (h) = max
(b,h,a,θ)∈B×H×A×([0,θ¯]∪{θ0})
m(θ) [w2(b, h, a, θ)− v(s, b, h, a)]− c(s, h), (A.16)
yields yet another optimal solution (qB2 , qS2 , w2) since, by Lemma A.3, the constraints associated
with elements θ > θ¯ can be ignored without loss of generality in (4.6)-(4.7). By Berge's Maximum
Theorem, qB2 and qS2 are continuous.
The former results imply the equivalent results to Theorems 24 in Section 4. The argument is
essentially the same, and is thus ommitted.
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